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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW REGARDING
AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES
MARY BETH MATTHEWS*
This article addresses recent administrative, legislative and
judicial developments affecting agricultural cooperatives.
Although little new ground appears to have been broken in the
past year or two, a recent governmental study, pending federal
legislation and new court decisions have further defined and clari-
fied the existing law.
Agricultural cooperatives are unique entities, formed to pro-
vide producers with marketing services or to supply them with
needed commodities at lower costs. Although generally incorpo-
rated, cooperatives are distinguished from other business enter-
prises by such characteristics as operation at cost, limited return
on investment, democratic control by members, and participation
in net margins on the basis of patronage.'
As economic associations formed for mutual benefit, agricul-
tural cooperatives are intended to strengthen their members' eco-
nomic position in the marketplace. The favorable governmental
attitude towards this effort at both the state and federal level is
reflected by specialized state incorporation statutes,2 unique fed-
eral income tax deductions, 3 partial antitrust exemptions, 4 and
judicial recognition of the unique nature of the cooperative enter-
prise.5 Whether that favorable attitude should be maintained is
* Associate Professor, University of Arkansas, Robert A. Leflar Law Center.
1. See generally AGRIC. COOPERATIVE SERVICE, USDA, Coop. INFORMATION REPORT
No. 1, COOPERATIVE PRINCIPLES AND LEGAL FOUNDATIONS (1977); FARMER
COOPERATIVE SERVICE, USDA, LEGAL PHASES OF FARMER COOPERATIVES (1976)
[hereinafter LEGAL PHASES]; EWELL P. Roy, COOPERATIVES: DEVELOPMENT, PRINCIPLES
AND MANAGEMENT (4th ed. 1981); ISRAEL PACKEL, THE ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION
OF COOPERATIVES (4th ed. 1970).
2. For a review of the state statutes governing agricultural cooperatives, see JAMES R.
BAARDA, AGRIC. COOPERATIVE SERVICE, USDA, COOPERATIVE INFORMATION REPORT No.
30, STATE INCORPORATION STATUTES FOR FARMER COOPERATIVES (1982).
3. Specialized federal income tax deductions are available to entities operating on a
cooperative basis pursuant to Subchapter T of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.
§§ 1381-1388 (1988). Additional deductions are available to cooperatives qualifying under
26 U.S.C. § 521 (1988). See discussion infra notes 108-136 and accompanying text.
4. The Capper-Volstead Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-292 (1988) (enacted in 1922 to create a
partial exclusion from the federal antitrust laws for agricultural cooperatives). See LEGAL
PHASES, supra note 1, at 293-317, and discussion infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., Claasen v. Farmers Grain Coop., 490 P. 2d 376, 381 (1971) (recognizing
that: "Permeating each of the conclusions herein is the general consideration that
cooperative marketing associations are fostered and encouraged by legislative enactment
and judicial construction .... ). See also Fairdale Farms v. Yankee Milk, Inc., 635 F.2d
1037, 1043 (2d Cir. 1980).
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one of the recurring themes in the recent developments discussed
in this article.
I. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MEMBER AND
COOPERATIVE
The relationship between member and cooperative differs in
many respects from that between a shareholder and a typical non-
cooperative, for-profit corporation. One of the key distinctions is
the type of rights acquired by investment. The purchaser of cor-
porate shares generally receives a proportional share of voting
rights, proportional distributions of income (dividends), and pro-
portional rights to assets at dissolution.6 The investment is gener-
ally intended to remain in the corporation until dissolution. If the
shareholder wants to recoup his investment prior to that event, he
generally does so by sale of the shares in the relevant market. A
purchaser of cooperative shares, in contrast, generally receives
one vote regardless of the number of shares held,7 and distribu-
tions of income are based on patronage rather than shareholdings.'
The distribution of assets at dissolution may also be allocated in
proportion to patronage rather than shares held.9 Furthermore,
most of the equity invested by cooperative members is generated
not by outright purchase of shares, but by the retention by the
cooperative of a portion of the purchase price for which products
are sold through the cooperative (or a portion of the savings gener-
ated by purchases through the cooperative).' 0 This investment,
referred to as a patronage retain, is generally evidenced by com-
mon stock, preferred stock, or some type of equity certificate or
book entry established for that member.'" Unlike the permanent
investment in a profit corporation, the equity invested in the coop-
6. See generally HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS
§ 124 (3d ed. 1983), which recognizes that:
Except as otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation, all shares enjoy
equal rights. Chief among these are: (a) the right to participate ratably in
earnings by way of dividends when, as and if declared by the board of directors,
usually in the exercise of discretion, out of legally available funds; (b) the right to
participate ratably in net assets (after satisfying liabilities to creditors) upon
liquidation; (c) the right to participate ratably (one vote per share) in control; and
(d) the preemptive rights to preserve ratably the foregoing rights.
Id.
7. See BAARDA, supra note 2, § 11.01 and Table 11.01.
8. For a discussion, see LEGAL PHASES, supra note 1, at 2-7.
9. See BAARDA, supra note 2, § 17.03.02 and Table 17.03.02. Statutes addressing the
distribution of assets by an agricultural cooperative at dissolution apportion them in three
ways: 1) according to property interests; 2) according to stock ownership, or 3) according to
past patronage. Id.
10. See generally LEGAL PHASES, supra note 1, at 471-80.
11. See generally MARY BETH MATTHEWS, AGRIC. COOPERATIVE SERVICE, USDA,
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erative in this manner is intended to be redeemed by the coopera-
tive at some point in the future.12 The timing and amount of
redemption is generally a financial decision made within the dis-
cretion of the board of directors, based on available assets. Coop-
erative members recoup the bulk of their investment not by sale
in a market, therefore, but by redemption of the shares or equity
certificates by the cooperative.' 3 Many of the traditional attrib-
utes of profit corporations do carry over to cooperatives, how-
ever.' 4 Corporate law generally supplements cooperative statutes
either impliedly or expressly.' 5 As in profit corporations, the rela-
tionship of the board to cooperative members is a fiduciary one.
The board, therefore, owes to the members such typical obliga-
tions as the duty to obey the cooperative articles and bylaws, and
the responsibility to treat members impartially.
The fiduciary duties owed to members in the cooperative set-
ting were recently considered in two interesting cases. The first,
Mitchellville Cooperative v. Indian Creek Corp.,16 was decided by
the Iowa Court of Appeals. The second, Hajmm Co. v. House of
Raeford Farms, Inc.," was decided by the North Carolina
Supreme Court. In Mitchellville, a cooperative filed an action
against a family farm corporation for amounts due on open
account for the purchase of hog feed. As an affirmative defense
and counterclaim, the member (Indian Creek Corporation)
asserted that the cooperative had violated fiduciary duties owed to
it in three respects. First, Indian Creek claimed that the priority
given by the cooperative articles to the redemption of preferred
stock owned by deceased natural persons and retirees was
improper. Second, the member asserted that the cooperative had
failed to fully inform it of the cooperative's complete redemption
program. Third, the member argued that the cooperative had
engaged in unfair competition and failed to disclose a material
conflict of interest by selling hog feed to a rival agricultural
cooperative.
ACS RESEARCH REPORT 68, FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS ISSUED BY AGRICULTURAL
COOPERATIVES (1988).
12. See generally AGRIC. COOPERATIVE SERVICE, USDA, ACS RESEARCH REPORT 23,
EQUITY REDEMPTION, ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES FOR FARMER COOPERATIVES (1982)
[hereinafter EQUITY REDEMPTION].
13. Id.
14. See generally ALLEN HOBERG & DOUGLAS FEE, AGRICULTURAL COOP. SERV.,
USDA, STAFF REPORT, DIRECTOR LIABILITY IN AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES (1984).
15. For express statutory supplementation, see BAARDA, supra note 2, § 1.04 and
Table 1.04.01.
16. 469 N.W.2d 258 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991).
17. 403 S.E.2d 483 (N.C. 1991).
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Perhaps the most interesting fiduciary issue raised by Indian
Creek's claims was never addressed by the Iowa Court of Appeals.
That issue is whether a cooperative, as a separate entity, owes a
fiduciary duty to its members. Although traditional corporate law
dictates that directors owe a fiduciary duty to their corporation,
and perhaps to the shareholders as a body, corporate law has not
generally recognized such a duty on the part of the entity itself.18
The relationship between a shareholder and the corporation is
basically founded upon contract. In the cooperative setting, the
rights and obligations constituting the agreement between the
parties should be found in the articles, the bylaws, the cooperative
resolutions, the membership application, the marketing contract,
etc. If those obligations are violated by the cooperative, the mem-
ber's cause of action against the cooperative should be based on
breach of contract, not breach of fiduciary obligation.
A cause of action against cooperative board members, on the
other hand, may be based on breach of fiduciary obligation. Direc-
tors owe duties to the cooperative and to the membership as a
whole to be loyal, to abide by the corporate documents, to act with
a certain degree of care, to treat members impartially, and so on.
Breach of those duties may render the director liable in tort. Per-
haps the breaches of duty asserted by Indian Creek against the
cooperative should, therefore, have been asserted against the
cooperative board members. The court in Mitchellville fails at
times to make the distinction between the two' 9 and ultimately
concludes that the evidence is insufficient to show a breach of duty
on the part of the cooperative.2" It would have been instructive
for the court to have examined the sources and parameters of such
a duty.
Without discussing the nature of such a cooperative duty, the
Iowa Court of Appeals rejected all three of Indian Creek's claims
18. See, e.g. HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 6, § 235 (discussing fiduciary duties of
directors, officers, and possibly shareholders in the corporate setting). See also 3 WILLIAM
M. FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 803-
860 (perm. ed. 1975) (discussing fiduciary duties of directors and employees). 6 WILLIAM M.
FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 2600-09
(perm. ed. 1989) (discussing fiduciary duties of a corporation only in the context of the
corporation's ability to become an agent or attorney in fact for another corporation or
natural person).
19. Mitchellville, 469 N.W.2d at 263. For example, the court discusses the duty to
disclose in terms of an obligation owed by the directors: "As fiduciaries, the directors owe a
duty to disclose information to those who have a right to know the facts .... " The court
concluded that no duty was breached in terms of the cooperative: "[W]e conclude that
there is insufficient evidence to show the Co-op breached a fiduciary duty or failed to
disclose relevant information to Indian Creek." Id. at 264.
20. Id.
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on the merits and affirmed judgment in favor of the cooperative.2 '
The court first considered the member's objection to the priority
given by the articles to the redemption of patronage stock held by
certain noncorporate members. 22 The cooperative articles specifi-
cally provided that redemption would first be applied to the fami-
lies of deceased members, then to retired members over the age of
65, and then to all other members.23 Indian Creek claimed that
the failure of the cooperative to provide a separate "death"
redemption policy for corporations violated the cooperative's duty
to provide an equitable program to redeem patronage equity.
Since a corporation cannot die, Indian Creek argued that the
cooperative was unfairly discriminating against it.
In determining the validity of the article provision, the Iowa
court considered the relevant statute. Unlike statutes in other
states, which prohibit discrimination between members,24 the
Iowa statute specifically provided that priority as to the redemp-
tion of patronage stock was given to deceased natural persons.25
Furthermore, the court cited with approval an opinion of the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals recognizing valid distinctions between cor-
porations and natural persons in regard to redemption.2 6 The
Kentucky court had acknowledged that the needs of surviving
family members are usually different from the needs of sharehold-
ers of a dissolved corporation, and that delay in redemption need
not delay the liquidation of a dissolved corporation as it might the
liquidation of an estate.27 Based on the differential treatment per-
mitted by the Iowa statute and the policy considerations noted by
the Kentucky court, the Iowa Court of Appeals held that under
Iowa law, a cooperative was not prohibited from prioritizing the
payment of patronage equity among deceased natural persons,
retirees, and corporations.28
21. Id.
22. Id. at 261-62.
23. Id. at 261.
24. The North Dakota statute scrutinized in In re Great Plains Royalty Corp., 471 F.2d
1261, 1264 (8th. Cir. 1973), prohibited discrimination in the distribution of net proceeds,
except between members and nonmembers in specific situations. Mitchellville, 469
N.W.2d at 261 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-15-33(4Xb) (1985)). The court therefore held
that the bylaw provisions requiring the early retirement of patronage equity upon the
death of any patron must be applied to a bankrupt corporation. Id. at 1265. A similar
holding was reached by the North Dakota Supreme Court in Schill v. Langdon Farmers
Union Oil Co., 442 N.W.2d 408 (N.D. 1989).
25. Mitchellville, 469 N.W.2d at 261 (citing IOWA CODE ANN. § 499.33 (1991)).
26. Id. at 261-62. See Richardson v. South Ky. Rural Elec. Coop., 566 S.W.2d 779 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1978).
27. Mitchellville, 469 N.W.2d at 262 (citing Richardson, 566 S.W.2d at 784).
28. Mitchellville, 469 N.W.2d at 262.
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In addition, Indian Creek argued that the cooperative had
breached a fiduciary duty by failing to inform Indian Creek of the
cooperative's complete redemption policy. The alleged breach
appeared to consist of two defects. The first was the failure of the
cooperative to inform Indian Creek that it had no policy of
redemption for corporate members prior to 1989. The second was
that no setoff of patronage stock against amounts due to the coop-
erative would be available.
The Iowa court recognized that cooperative directors owe the
corporation complete loyalty, honesty and good faith, and further
owe a duty to the shareholders to disclose information affecting
the general welfare of the corporation. 29 However, the record
indicated that the president/principal shareholder of Indian
Creek had been provided with and had read copies of the coopera-
tive articles and redemption policy. As early as 1979, he was
aware that the cooperative had no policy for corporate redemp-
tion, and he had urged the board on a number of occasions to
adopt a policy that would be more fair to corporate members. The
court further noted that Indian Creek's principal shareholder had
both a law and veterinary degree and that in spite of the available
information about cooperative redemption policies, Indian Creek
had remained a member of the cooperative for over ten years.30
Finally, the court pointed out that Indian Creek had received over
$49,000 through the cooperative's redemption plan when
adopted.31 Based on these factors, the court held that the evi-
dence was insufficient to show that the cooperative had "breached
a fiduciary duty or failed to disclose relevant information to Indian
Creek."3
2
Finally, Indian Creek argued that the cooperative had
breached a fiduciary duty to its members by selling hog feed to a
rival agricultural cooperative. As discussed above, the court con-
sidered whether such duty had been breached without addressing
the source of the duty.33 Indian Creek contended that such con-
duct constituted either unfair competition or a failure to disclose
material facts concerning a conflict of interest. The court pointed
out, however, that the relevant Iowa statute34 specifically author-
ized the board to deal with nonmembers so long as their share of
29. Id. at 263.
30. Id. at 264.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
34. IOWA CODE § 499.3 (1989), summarized in Mitchellville, 469 N.W.2d at 260.
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the business did not exceed dealings with members. 35 The court
indicated that some amount of competition should therefore be
anticipated, stating: "In today's highly complex marketplace, it is
wholely within the realm of expectation there will be some com-
petition between members of a coop and nonmembers who do
business with the coop."'36 Because the board had not engaged in
oppressive tactics such as depleting assets, paying disproportionate
salaries, or freezing out minority shareholders, the court found no
breach of fiduciary duty on the part of the cooperative.3 7
In addition to providing some guidance as to fiduciary duties
owed by a cooperative board, the Mitchellville opinion addressed
another frequent equity redemption issue-the question of set-
off. 38 A variety of cooperative members through the years have
attempted to claim that patronage equities should be available to
offset a cooperative claim for amounts due. The courts have gen-
erally rejected such an approach. 39  The Mississippi Supreme
Court, in Clarke County Cooperative v. Read, explained:40
It is well settled that equity credits allocated to a patron
on the books of a cooperative do not reflect an indebted-
ness which is presently due and payable by the coopera-
tive to such patron .... The interest will be paid to the
patron at some unspecified later date to be determined by
the board of directors of the cooperative. ... The patron
has no right to offset such equity credits, not being an
indebtedness which is presently due and payable, against
an indebtedness which is presently due and payable by
him to the cooperative.41
35. Mitchellville, 469 N.W.2d at 264.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 262-63.
39. See Howard v. Eatonton Coop. Feed Co., 177 S.E.2d 658 (Ga. 1970) (no setoff of
equity credits against indebtedness due to cooperative at merger); Forrest County Coop.
Ass'n v. Manis, 235 So. 2d 925 (Miss. 1970) (no setoff of equity credits against indebtedness
due to cooperative); Christian County Farmers Supply Co. v. Rivard, 476 N.E.2d 452 (I!1.
App. Ct. 1985) (no setoff of preferred stock against indebtedness due to cooperative);
Atchison County Farmers Union v. Turnbull, 736 P.2d 917 (Kan. 1987) (no setoff of equity
credits against indebtedness due to cooperative).
Setoff was permitted in Southeastern Colo. Coop. v. Ebright, 563 P.2d 30 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1977), but only because the relevant cooperative had not taken steps to convert net
margins into patronage equity. In that case, the bylaws provided that members were
entitled to receive their proportional share of net margins. Id. at 32. Although the bylaws
further provided that the board could require contributions of additional capital, no
amounts had been debited from the member's share of net margins on the ledger account.
Id. at 33. Therefore, the court held that the full amount of proportional net margins was
available as a setoff in favor of the member in issue. Id.
40. 139 So. 2d 639 (Miss. 1962).
41. Clark County Coop. v. Read, 139 So. 2d 636, 641 (Miss. 1962).
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The member in Mitchellville approached the setoff issue
somewhat more creatively. Rather than argue that the preferred
stock itself created a current obligation on the part of the coopera-
tive, Indian Creek claimed that the cooperative's breaches of fidu-
ciary duty created a mature tort claim.42 Thus, Indian Creek
argued that its current indebtedness to the cooperative for hog
feed should be offset by the cooperative's current indebtedness to
it for breach of fiduciary duty (apparently measured by the value
of the preferred stock). Indian Creek's unique argument was no
more successful than the traditional ones made by its predecessors.
After a brief review of cooperative setoff cases, the Iowa Court of
Appeals concluded that in the absence of fraud or oppressive con-
duct, Indian Creek had no right to setoff.43 The court adopted the
traditional rationale:
We do not believe the patronage funds sought to be setoff
by Indian Creek are an indebtedness of the cooperative
which is due and payable to members, but represent an
interest which will be paid at some future date to be
determined by the board of directors ....
Fiduciary obligations on the part of the cooperative board
were also recently considered by the North Carolina Supreme
Court in Hajmm Co. v. House of Raeford Farms, Inc.45 The court
in that case affirmed an award of damages against a cooperative
and its president/ chairman of the board for failure to redeem
patronage equities in the form of a revolving certificate. The opin-
ion gives guidance to both the extent of fiduciary duties and to the
method of establishing the breach of those duties at trial.
The plaintiff in Hajmm was one of three turkey producers
who joined together to form a cooperative, House of Raeford
Farms (Raeford). The turkey producers sold their stock in an
existing corporation to Raeford and received revolving fund certif-
icates as part of the consideration for the stock. The certificates
recited that they bore no interest, were subordinate to other debt,
were subject to the company's bylaws (which were incorporated
by reference), and were retirable in the sole discretion of the
42. Mitchellville, 469 N.W.2d at 260. As discussed, the breaches of fiduciary duty
should perhaps have been asserted against the cooperative board rather than the
cooperative itself. The claim against the cooperative would seem to have been based upon
a breach of contract.
43. Id. at 263.
44. id.
45. 403 S.E.2d 483 (N.C. 1991).
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board "either fully or on a pro rata basis."46 The bylaws stated that
the certificates "shall be issued in annual series. .. and each series
shall be retired fully or on a pro rata basis, only at the discretion of
the board ... in the order of issuance by years as funds are avail-
able for that purpose. ' 47 The certificates were reflected as stock-
holders' equity on Raeford's balance sheet.
During 1978, Raeford retired the revolving certificate issued
to one of the three original turkey producers, Stone Brothers. 48
Stone Brothers had negotiated the relevant certificate to FCX,
Inc., and the retirement was a component of Raeford's purchase of
all interest FCX then held in Raeford.49 No value was placed on
the certificate when it was retired. The retirement was reflected
on Raeford's books by discounting the certificate to zero value.
Some time later, Raeford retired the revolving certificate
issued to the second of the three original producers. Retirement
was also shown on Raeford's books by discounting the certificate to
zero value. Furthermore, Raeford retired certificates of the same
series (although of a different class) issued to other patrons of
Raeford.50 The third original revolving certificate held by the
46. Hajmm Co. v. House of Raeford Farms, Inc., 403 S.E.2d 483, 485-86 (N.C. 1991).
47. Id. at 486.
48. The relevant transactions are set out in greater detail by the North Carolina Court
of Appeals in Hajmm Co. v. House of Raeford Farms, Inc., 379 S.E.2d 868, 870-71 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1989).
49. Both the purpose and the detail of the retirement of the certificates held by the
two other original holders are not clear from the opinions. The relevant opinions discuss
these financial transactions in conclusory terms. The North Carolina Court of Appeals
merely states:
The same year, Raeford retired the Class B-Series 1975 certificate originally
issued to Stone Bros., who negotiated its certificate to FCX, Inc. In its 1984
financial statement Raeford discounted to zero value the Stone Bros./FCX
certificate and the certificate to NJS. Raeford subtracted the value of the Stone
Bros./FCX and NJS Class B-Series 1975 certificates from the total amount owed
on other certificates, thereby reducing stockholder's equity. Plaintiff's Class B-
Series 1975 certificate was not redeemed at that time and continues to be shown
as part of stockholder's equity in Raeford's financial statements.
Hajmm Co., 379 S.E.2d at 871. The North Carolina Supreme Court provides little further
explanation:
During 1978 Raeford retired the revolving fund certificate originally issued to
Stone Brothers but which Stone Brothers had by then transferred to FCX, Inc.
No value was placed on the certificate when it was retired. This retirement was
a component of Raeford's purchase of all interest FCX then held in Raeford and
was shown on Raeford's books by discounting the certificate to zero value.
Some time later Raeford retired the NJS certificate. Retirement of this cer-
tificate was also shown on Raeford's books by discounting the certificate to zero
value.
Hajmm Co., 403 S.E.2d at 486.
50. These facts are stated in more detail in the intermediate court opinion. See Hajmm
Co., 379 S.E.2d 868 at 870-72 (Class B-Series 1975 Revolving Fund Certificates were
issued to the former owners, while Class A-Series 1975 certificates were issued to patron
members).
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plaintiff, Hajmm, was not retired. Hajmm thereafter made
demand for the retirement of its revolving certificate (by payment
in full rather than by any type of discounting as with the other two
certificates) but Raeford refused. Hajmm, therefore, instituted suit
against Raeford and its president/chairman of the board (Johnson)
for compensatory, punitive and treble damages. The plaintiff
claimed that the failure to retire its revolving certificate consti-
tuted a breach of fiduciary duty, breach of corporate bylaws, and
unfair practices affecting commerce.
The unfair practices claim was dismissed by the trial court.5 1
On the remaining claims, a jury awarded Hajmm compensatory
damages of $387,500 against both Raeford and Johnson (the presi-
dent/chairman of the board), plus punitive damages of $100,000
against Raeford. On appeal, the intermediate court reversed the
dismissal of the unfair practices claim but found no error in the
trial.5 2 The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the award of
both compensatory and punitive damages but agreed with the
trial court that no unfair practices claim had been stated.
The issues raised in Mitchellville as to the nature of the duties
owed by a cooperative and its board were again raised in the
Hajmm case. Perhaps these issues can be more clearly analyzed
by scrutinizing the basis of the actions against both Raeford and
Johnson. When a cooperative fails to abide by its own structural
documents, it should be liable to its member for breach of con-
tract. Since both Raeford's bylaws and the instruments issued in
Hajmm required that the revolving certificates be retired as a
series, either fully or pro rata, Hajmm ought to have been able to
insist that all certificates of that series be retired simultaneously.
Failure to do so would give rise to a cause of action against the
cooperative for breach of contract.53  Such a cause of action
appears to have been stated by the plaintiff ("breach of corporate
bylaws") and should have supported an award of compensatory
damages by the jury against Raeford.
Furthermore, cooperative directors have a fiduciary obliga-
tion to comply with and carry out the cooperative documents.
The failure to do so should give rise to a cause of action against the
51. Hajmm Co., 403 S.E.2d at 483 n.l. The North Carolina Supreme Court noted that
this claim was dismissed at the August 4, 1986 session of Superior Court, Scotland County.
Id.
52. Hajmm Co., 379 S.E.2d at 877.
53. The intermediate court opinion recognized this relationship, stating, "'Plaintiff's
certificate constituted a contract between plaintiff and Raeford .... Raeford's by-laws were
incorporated into plaintiff's certificate. Those by-laws constituted additional terms of the
parties's contract .... ." Id. at 874.
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directors for breach of the fiduciary obligation of obedience.5 4 As
to this issue, no question of discretion should be involved. If the
bylaws require the board to retire only pro rata, it must do so.
Failure of the board to abide by the bylaws should thus support an
award of compensatory damages against the board for breach of
fiduciary obligations.
The bylaws in Hajmm gave the directors certain discretion.
The bylaws did not address whether some certificates could be
retired and not others, but rather granted the directors discretion
to determine whether the cooperative was in a financial position
to retire any certificates at all. The issue of whether the directors
abused their discretion in refusing to retire Hajmm's certificate
was submitted to the jury, which found that the only director
named as a defendant did breach a duty in failing to retire it.55
Thus, the jury appeared to have found that the board breached its
fiduciary duties both in failing to retire all certificates equally as
required by the bylaws and in abusing its discretionary power to
determine whether certificates should be retired at all.
The analysis thus far is consistent with a finding of breach of
contract on the part of the cooperative, and breach of fiduciary
duties on the part of the board. However, certain expert testi-
mony and findings by the jury went even further. In response to
interrogatories, the jury concluded that the cooperative owed a
fiduciary duty to the member5 6 and that the cooperative had
breached that duty by failing to engage in an open, fair and honest
transaction. 7 As was discussed in regard to Mitchellville, such a
duty is not commonly recognized in corporate law.58 Fiduciary
duties are generally imposed upon the corporate board, not the
corporate entity itself.
It is possible that the finding of a fiduciary duty on the part of
the cooperative could be confined to the unique circumstances of
54. See generally HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 6, §§ 231, 233.
55. Hajmm, 403 S.E.2d at 486. The jury's response to interrogatories was as follows:
3. Do the defendants, E. Marvin Johnson and Raeford Farms, Inc. owe a
fiduciary duty to the plaintiff, HAJMM? Yes.
4. If so, was their refusal to retire HAJMM's revolving fund certificate an open,
fair and honest transaction? No.
Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 491. The court concluded that there was substantial evidence that "both
defendants breached their fiduciary duties by not retiring the certificate." Id. The court
noted that the term " 'breach of fiduciary duties' "was not specifically submitted to the jury,
but found that the question submitted regarding" 'open, fair and honest' " transactions was
an equivalent submission. Id. at 491 n.4.
58. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
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the case. Hajmm appeared to be arguing that a fiduciary relation-
ship arose when it accepted the revolving certificate in return for
its interest in the prior corporation. The evidence indicated that
Hajmm placed special confidence and trust in both defendants
when it did so and justifiably expected them to deal fairly.59 In
contrast, the defendants appeared to be arguing that only a
debtor-creditor relationship existed. Therefore, the jury's finding
that a fiduciary relationship existed ° could be interpreted as being
based on the unique relationships created by the parties at the ini-
tial formation of the cooperative, rather than upon the garden
variety cooperative-member relationship. The opinion of the
North Carolina Supreme Court suggests this possibility, noting
that there is no rigid definition of a fiduciary relationship and that
it may stem from varied and unpredictable factors. 1
The impact of the Hajmm case is therefore unclear. If the
opinion is interpreted as supporting a fiduciary obligation on the
part of every cooperative to every member, then it may alter the
way the relationship between the two is analyzed. The source,
scope, and effect of the cooperative's fiduciary duties will have to
be carefully considered. If, on the other hand, the court is merely
saying that a fiduciary relationship was created between the plain-
tiff and the cooperative in Hajmm because of their unique circum-
stances, the impact would be much less significant.
The court's failure to more clearly explore the source of the
fiduciary duties is especially troublesome in Hajmm because of the
award of punitive damages. Since punitive damages do not nor-
mally lie for breach of contract, it would seem inappropriate for
the jury to award them against the cooperative for breach of its
bylaws. On the other hand, the jury might appropriately award
punitive damages against the board for a tortious breach of fiduci-
ary obligation. The jury in Hajmm chose to award $100,000 in
punitive damages against the cooperative, but none against John-
son. It therefore appears that the jury was punishing the coopera-
tive for breach of its fiduciary obligations. The existence and
extent of duties owed by a cooperative entity, therefore seem to
be of fundamental importance in determining the validity of the
punitive damage award against the cooperative.
59. Hajmm, 403 S.E.2d at 490.
60. The jury's finding was based upon the opinion of an expert witness. Id. at 487-89.
For a discussion of the expert witness, see infra note 64 and accompanying text
(recognizing that this expert testimony was held to have been improperly admitted).
61. Hajmm, 403 S.E.2d at 488.
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The Hajmm case provides some guidance as to how a breach
of fiduciary duties should be proven at trial. On the issue of the
board's abuse of discretion in retiring equity, the court indicated
that the availability of funds for retirement was one factor that
could be taken into account by the jury.6 2 Thus, the jury could
consider that Raeford had loaned over $1 million to Johnson and
his family's other businesses, had made made large purchases such
as a corporate jet, had shown an increase of over $11 million in net
worth, had invested $3.4 million in outside securities and had
$922,000 cash on hand.63
However, the court indicated that whether a fiduciary rela-
tionship existed between the Hajmm Company and the defend-
ants, and whether duties arising from such relationship had been
breached, were not matters for expert testimony. The admission
of the testimony of an expert witness that such relationship existed
and that such duties had been breached was held to be
improper. 64 The court indicated that the expert could testify as to
the existence of the underlying factual components, but that the
existence of the relationships were matters for the jury.65 How-
ever, the court concluded that the error in Hajmm was a harmless
one, because the expert's testimony was merely cumulative or cor-
roborative of other evidence.
The Hajmm case further illustrates the type of conduct which
may support an award of punitive damages against the coopera-
tive. When Hajmm made demand on Raeford for redemption of
its certificate, the directors stated that they "had us a little meet-
ing and decided that we didn't need to bother with it; it shouldn't
be paid, it wasn't good business and we didn't do it."'6 6  Johnson
also told other persons that he might never pay the certificate.
The court held that the state of the evidence was such that the
62. Id. at 491.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 487-89. The expert was Dr. James Baarda. See BAARDA, supra note 2. Such
expert testimony might still be valuable in future cases, but would be subjected to a
narrower scope under the North Carolina court's interpretation. The court gave some
guidance as to the reach of such testimony:
A qualified expert such as Dr. Baarda should be permitted under Evidence Rule
704 to give an expert opinion regarding the existence of these factors. For
example, the expert witness may give an opinion that under the circumstances
one party has reposed special confidence in another party, or that one party
should act in good faith toward another party, or that one party must act with
due regard to the interests of another party. However, the witness may not
opine that a fiduciary relationship exists or has been breached.
Hajmm, 403 S.E.2d at 490.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 492.
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jury could find the conduct reached the level of "outrageousness"
required by the jury instructions to support punitive damages,
even apart from the erroneously admitted expert testimony. 7
The Hajmm court also rejected the plaintiff's effort to charac-
terize the failure to redeem cooperative equity as a treble damage
claim for unfair trade practices under North Carolina statute.68
The trial court dismissed the claim because Hajmm failed to estab-
lish that the defendants' conduct was "in or affecting commerce"
within the meaning of the statute, and the North Carolina
Supreme Court agreed.
As these two cases indicate, the relationship between a coop-
erative and its member is a complex one. The cooperative board
clearly owes fiduciary duties to its members. Whether the cooper-
ative itself similarly owes fiduciary duties is a more controversial
question. Although neither case comprehensively addresses the
source or scope of such a duty, the implied recognition of its exist-
ence should make both cases important in the future evolution of
the cooperative-member relationship.
II. RELATIONSHIPS WITH THIRD PARTIES
Recent cooperative cases have dealt not only with the internal
relationship between the cooperative and its members, but also
with their relationships to third parties. One facet of such external
relationships is the interference by third parties with the market-
ing contract between the cooperative and its member. The
favorable governmental attitude toward cooperatives in the past
has been reflected by the provision of liberal rights and remedies
against parties interfering with a cooperative marketing contract.
State cooperative statutes variously prohibit interference, establish
civil fines, criminal penalties and treble damages, 69 authorize
injunctions,7 0 and provide that the filing of the marketing contract
gives constructive notice of the cooperative's rights.7' Further
remedies may be provided by state common law or by federal stat-
ute. A court may, therefore, be required to determine the availa-
bility and applicability of varying remedies.
The relationship among some of these sources of remedies was
recently considered by the Sixth Circuit in Southern Milk Sales,
67. Id.
68. Id. at 492-94.
69. See BAARDA, supra note 2, § 14.04.17 and Table 14.04.17.
70. See id. § 14.04.14 and Table 14.04.14.
71. See id. § 14.04.11 and Table 14.04.11.
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Inc. v. Martin.7 2 In that case, a dairy marketing cooperative con-
tracted with a certain hauler to deliver its members' milk to a
processing plant. At the instigation of a milk broker, however, the
hauler began diverting his milk pickup to another purchaser for
the benefit of a competitor of the cooperative. The cooperative
sought a preliminary injunction against the hauler, the broker, and
the competitor to restrain them from wrongfully interfering with
its contracts with its members.
The cooperative sought the preliminary injunction pursuant
to a Michigan cooperative statute,73 Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 65, and the federal Agricultural Fair Practices Act.74
Between the state statute and the federal rule, the court was faced
with two issues. The first issue was whether the remedy of a pre-
liminary injunction was created by the Michigan statute at all. The
second issue was whether the state statute or the federal rule set
the standard for its issuance.
Although inclined to conclude that the Michigan statute con-
templated only a permanent injunction, the court ultimately did
not decide the first issue. 75 Rather, the Sixth Circuit held that
whether a preliminary injunction should issue was a question of
procedure and that federal law should, therefore, have been
applied by the district court.76 Therefore, the court held that the
standards for issuance of the preliminary injunction were those set
by the federal rule.77 Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure requires a showing of irreparable injury in order for a prelim-
inary injunction to issue.78 Since the cooperative had made no
such showing, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the
injunction.79
The same analysis appeared to render moot the issue of
whether a preliminary injunction should be issued pursuant to the
Agricultural Fair Practices Act (AFPA). Although acknowledging
that the cooperative might have standing for relief under that stat-
ute, the Sixth Circuit stated that the issuance of a preliminary
injunction would still be governed by federal procedural law
72. 924 F.2d 98 (6th Cir. 1991).
73. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.109 (West 1990).
74. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2301-06 (1988).
75. Southern Milk Sales, Inc. v. Martin, 924 F.2d 98, 102 (6th Cir. 1991).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 102-03.
78. Id. The court relied on the four-part test for Rule 65 set forth in In re DeLorean
Motor Co., 755 F.2d 1223, 1228 (6th Cir. 1985). Id. at 103 n.3.
79. Southern Milk Sales, 924 F.2d at 103.
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rather than the substantive provisions of the AFPA.8 °
The Southern Milk case illustrates the difficulty courts may
have in choosing between conflicting sources of cooperative reme-
dies. The court may first have to determine if the remedy is cre-
ated by the relevant provision, and then resolve conflicts and
supersession issues created by other law.
III. ANTITRUST
Another field in which agricultural cooperatives have enjoyed
some measure of governmental favor is antitrust enforcement.
The Capper-Volstead Act 81 was enacted in 1922 to permit produ-
cers who meet certain conditions to act together in associations to
collectively process and market agricultural products.8 2 However,
the courts made clear that the protection from antitrust enforce-
ment created by Capper-Volstead was only partial. Cooperative
antitrust protection did not extend to conspiracies or combinations
with noncooperatives,8 3 to predatory tactics, 84 or to entities not
composed of producers.8 5
Although mergers between cooperatives have not generally
been subjected to antitrust challenges,8 acquisitions by coopera-
80. Id.
81. 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-292 (1988).
82. See generally LEGAL PHASES, supra note 1, at 265-321; Eugene M. Warlich &
Robert S. Brill, Cooperatives Vis-a-vis Corporations: Size, Antitrust and Immunity, 23 S.D.
L. REV. 561 (1978) (examines the application of antitrust law to cooperatives and the
relation to non-cooperative business corporations); David T, Baumer, Robert T. Masson &
Robin Abrahamson Masson, Curdling the Competition: An Economic and Legal Analysis of
the Antitrust Exemption for Agriculture, 31 VILL. L. REV. 183 (1986) (uses the dairy
industry as an economic model for legal analysis demonstrating how antitrust laws may be
used to combat cooperative monopolization, anticompetitive mergers, and undue price
enhancement); Thomas W. Paterson & Willard F. Mueller, Sherman Section 2
Monopolization for Agricultural Marketing Cooperatives, 60 TUlL. L. REV. 955 (1986)
(evaluates application of § 2 of Sherman Act to agricultural marketing cooperatives); A.S.
Klein, Annotation, Monopolies: Construction of § I of the Capper- Volstead Act (7 USCS
f 291) Authorizing Persons Engaged in the Production of Agricultural Products to Act
Together in Association, 20 A.L.R. FED. 924 (1974) (collects federal cases dealing with the
construction and application of § 1 of the Capper-Volstead Act).
83. United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188 (1939).
84. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 362 U.S. 458
(1960); Otto Milk Co. v. United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 388 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1967);
Fairdale Farms v. Yankee Milk, Inc., 635 F.2d 1037 (2d Cir. 1980).
85. Case-Swayne Co., Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 389 U.S. 384 (1967); National
Broiler Marketing Ass'n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816 (1978). See also Worth Rowley &
Marvin Beshore, Chicken Integrators'Price-Fixing: A Fox in the Capper-Volstead Coop, 24
S.D. L. REV. 564 (1979).
86. Baumer, Masson & Masson, supra note 82, at 239 n.210. Between 1968 and 1972,
mergers by 217 milk cooperatives went unchallenged. Id. Commentators suggest that this
is a matter of federal enforcement policy and that such attack would be "ludicrous since
Capper-Volstead specifically allows cooperatives to engage in collective action tantamount
to a de facto merger." Note, Trust Busting Down on the Farm: Narrowing the Scope of
Antitrust Exemptions for Agricultural Cooperatives, 61 VA. L. REV. 341, 374-75 (1975).
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tives of noncooperatives have been successfully attacked.87 The
most recent challenge considered by the federal district court, at
the preliminary injunction stage, was United States v. Country
Lake Foods, Inc.88 In that case, Country Lake Foods entered into
a contract to purchase all of the outstanding stock of a non-
cooperative fluid milk processor.8 9 The government then sought
to preliminarily and permanently enjoin the proposed acquisition,
asserting that it would substantially lessen competition in the rele-
vant product and geographic markets in violation of section 7 of
the Clayton Act.9"
The federal district court denied the government's motion for
preliminary injunction, concluding that the government had failed
to show a probability of success on the merits either in establishing
the relevant geographic market or in proving that the proposed
acquisition was likely to substantially lessen competition in that
market.91 The government had asserted that the relevant market
was the area approximately within fifty miles of Minneapolis, and
the court acknowledged that if it were to accept such as the rele-
vant market, it would be "highly concentrated" under the HHI
index.92 Such a high concentration would warrant a presumption
of a prima facie violation of section 7, unless the defendants
presented clear evidence that the proposed acquisition was not
likely to have such anticompetitive effects.
The court found that the government had failed to define the
area of effective competition in terms that reflected the actual
dynamics of the fluid milk market.93 Persuasive evidence indi-
cated that distant dairies might enter the market area if prices
87. See, e.g. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n, 362 U.S. at 472-73 (the
relevant cooperative was forced to divest itself of a competitor noncooperative dairy). See
also United States v. Rice Growers Ass'n, 1986-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,288 (Rice Growers
Association of California was required to divest itself of Pacific International Rice Mills).
88. 754 F. Supp. 669 (D. Minn. 1990).
89. United States v. Country Lake Foods, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 669, 670 (D. Minn. 1990).
Country Lake Foods, Inc. is a majority-owned subsidiary of Land O'Lakes, Inc. See James R.
Baarda, Court Okays Dairy Acquisition, FARMER COOPERATIVES, Oct. 1990, at 27.
90. Country Lake Foods, 754 F. Supp. at 670. Section 7 of the Clayton Act, codified at
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988), provides that:
No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce shall
acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share
capital . . . of another person engaged also in commerce or in any activity
affecting commerce, where in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting
commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
91. Country Lake Foods, 754 F. Supp. at 681.
92. Id. at 673. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is a measure of market concentration
calculated by squaring the market share of each firm competing in the market and then
summing the resulting numbers. Id. at 673 n.4.
93. Id. at 675.
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increased and could profitably compete even without a price
increase. The court therefore concluded that the government's
proposed relevant geographic market was too small.94 Because
prior case law held that a preliminary injunction could still be
appropriate in certain circumstances, however, the court went on
to consider the government's likelihood of success on the merits
should that geographic market be accepted.95
In regard to whether the proposed acquisition would substan-
tially lessen competition, the defendant cooperative introduced
evidence indicating that the proposed acquisition was likely to
enhance, rather than diminish, competition. The cooperative
established that low entry barriers existed, making it unlikely that
a price increase could be sustained. The cooperative further
showed that milk purchasers had significant market power, that
buyers might vertically integrate in response to increased prices,
and that the acquisition might enable the cooperative to compete
directly with the market leader. The court found, therefore, that
the government had failed to show a probability of success in prov-
ing that the acquisition would substantially lessen competition.96
The dairy industry was also the focus of a recent governmen-
tal study on the current role and effect of the Capper-Volstead
Act.97 In response to a request by Senators Metzenbaum and
Bradley, the General Accounting Office (GAO) undertook a study
to determine dairy farmers' continued need for the exemption,
the effect of the exemption on dairy prices, and the adequacy of
oversight of cooperative pricing activities provided by the United
States Department of Agriculture (USDA). Despite the fact that
the study focuses only on the dairy industry and in some respects
fails to reach definitive conclusions, it provides valuable guidance
as to continued governmental support for the Capper-Volstead
exemption. The study also revives a continuing controversy about
the role of the USDA in cooperative antitrust enforcement.
The GAO first concluded that valid justifications for the Cap-
per-Volstead exemption continue to exist. Although acknowledg-
ing that the dairy industry has changed significantly since the
statute was adopted in 1922, the study indicated that dairy farmers
continue to be of relatively small size compared to the increasingly
94. Id. at 680.
95. Id. at 678.
96. Id. at 680.
97. 7 U.S.C. §§ 291, 292 (1988). See also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED
90-186, DAIRY COOPERATIVES: ROLE AND EFFECTS OF THE CAPPER-VOLSTEAD
ANTITRUST EXEMPTION (Sept. 1990) [hereinafter DAIRY COOPERATIVES].
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concentrated processing and distribution firms that purchase their
products. The study inferred that dairy farmers would continue to
be in a relatively weak bargaining position if required to act with-
out cooperatives. To the extent of this offset, therefore, the GAO
concluded that "the premise of the Capper-Volstead antitrust
exemption for cooperatives-that farmers cannot effectively bar-
gain independently because their operations are too small-
remains."98
The study was much less conclusive as to the price-enhancing
effects of Capper-Volstead. A review of the research by the GAO
indicated that the relationship between cooperative market power
and over-order payments in the dairy industry remained unclear.
The GAO therefore stated that "we see no basis for reaching a
definitive conclusion concerning the effect of Capper-Volstead on
either consumer prices or government costs." 99
The GAO was more outspoken in its suggestions for changes
in cooperative antitrust enforcement. Section 2 of the Capper-
Volstead Act imposes the responsibility for ensuring that coopera-
tives do not abuse their antitrust exemption upon the Secretary of
Agriculture. 00 More specifically, the USDA is responsible for
restraining cooperatives when it believes they are "unduly
enhancing" prices.010 A 1979 GAO study had criticized the
USDA's performance of this enforcement role, expressing concern
that the USDA was not actively monitoring cooperative pricing
and questioning whether the USDA could effectively both
encourage and regulate cooperatives.1 0 2
The 1991 GAO study reiterated these concerns and con-
cluded that the USDA had done little since 1979 to improve its
oversight activities.10 3 The report stated that the USDA continued
98. DAIRY COOPERATIVES, supra note 97, at 3.
99. Id. at 28.
100. 7 U.S.C. § 292 (1988). Section 2 of the Capper-Volstead Act provides:
If the Secretary of Agriculture shall have reason to believe that any such
association monopolizes or restrains trade in interstate or foreign commerce to
such an extent that the price of any agricultural product is unduly enhanced by
reason thereof, he shall serve upon such association a complaint stating his
charge in that respect, to which complaint shall be attached, or contained
therein, a notice of hearing ....
Id.
101. Id.
102. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/CED 79-109, FAMILY FARMERS NEED
COOPERATIVES: BUT SOME ISSUES NEED TO BE RESOLVED 42-44 (July 26, 1979)
[hereinafter FAMILY FARMERS]. See also James F. Baarda, Current Cooperative Topics:
Cooperative Antitrust Inquiries, 12 J. AG. TAX & LAW 78 (1990) (provides further
background on the dispute).
103. DAIRY COOPERATIVES, supra note 97, at 4-5.
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to investigate complaints as received rather than actively monitor
prices, and it had investigated only eight complaints in 68 years-
all of which had been dismissed. 104 Furthermore, the role of the
FTC in monitoring cooperatives had been reduced since 1979.
Federal statutes had barred the FTC from examining cooperative
conduct exempted under Capper-Volstead in an effort to elimi-
nate perceived operational conflicts between the USDA and the
FTC. 0 5
Based on its continuing concerns, the GAO recommended
that Congress closely monitor the USDA, and if the USDA failed to
initiate active monitoring of cooperative activities, Congress
should consider assigning regulatory responsibility for cooperative
pricing activities to the FTC.1' 6 The report noted, however, that
USDA officials disagreed with the need for such oversight. 10 7 The
controversy regarding the role of the USDA in cooperative anti-
trust enforcement therefore continues.
As indicated by this review, agricultural cooperatives remain
subject to antitrust challenge when engaging in activities outside
the protection of the Capper-Volstead Act-such as acquiring non-
cooperative entities. Although cooperatives may take comfort in
the continued support for favorable antitrust treatment evidenced
by the recent GAO report, they should heed the note of warning
sounded by its criticism of the USDA's enforcement role.
IV. COOPERATIVE TAXATION
Efforts have recently been made to resolve two tax issues
which have been the source of dispute between the IRS and coop-
eratives through the years. The first issue concerns the characteri-
zation of cooperative income as patronage or nonpatronage
sourced. The second issue pertains to the requirements for quali-
fying as an "exempt" cooperative under section 521 of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code.
In recognition of their conduit nature, cooperatives are
granted certain deductions under Subchapter T of the Internal
Revenue Code not available to profit corporations.'0 8 These
deductions consist of amounts returned to cooperative patrons as a
portion of the earnings or savings generated by their patronage. 10 9
104. Id. at 30-31.
105. Id. at 32.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 33.
108. 26 U.S.C. §§ 1381-88 (1988).
109. See id. § 1388(a). The definition of "Patronage dividend" contained in the
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The effect of Subchapter T is that such "patronage dividends" are
taxed once-at the patron level-rather than taxed twice like cor-
porate dividends." 0
In order to qualify as "patronage dividends" eligible for the
Subchapter T deduction, cooperative earnings must be generated
by business with or for patrons."' The cooperative acts as a chan-
neling agent for those funds only. Nonpatronage income, in con-
trast, is taxed at both the cooperative and patron levels like the
earnings of any profit corporation. Furthermore, in order to pre-
vent distortions of cooperative income, gains or losses generated
by nonpatronage business may not be used to offset gains or losses
generated by patronage business." 2 The characterization of
income can thus be crucial in determining the tax liability of a
cooperative.
Whether income generated by the sale of a cooperative asset
is patronage or nonpatronage sourced has been the basis of dispute
in the cooperative area for many years. The Treasury Regulations
adopted pursuant to Subchapter T, by way of example, categorize
income derived from the sale or exchange of capital assets as non-
patronage income. "13 However, the courts on occasion have found
that the sale of assets used in the cooperative's business can be
patronage sourced."' The test adopted by the courts and by the
revenue rulings for categorizing cooperative income as patronage
sourced has generally been whether the transaction facilitated the
basic purchasing, marketing, or service activities of the coopera-
tive rather than merely enhancing its overall profitability."-
Internal Revenue Code includes the requirement that such amount be paid to a patron "on
the basis of quantity or value of business done with or for such patron." Id.
110. The Tax Court in Kingfisher Coop. Elevator Ass'n v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 600,
613 (1985), recognized "[T]he foundation of subchapter T is a single level of tax." Id.
111. 26 U.S.C. § 1388(a) (1988) (providing that the term "Patronage dividend" "does
not include any amount paid to a patron to the extent that such amount is out of earnings
other than from business done with or for patrons").
112. Id. § 1388(jX1) (specifying that the net earnings of the cooperative may be
determined "by offsetting patronage losses... against patronage earnings .... "). The terms
"patronage earnings" and "patronage losses" mean "earnings and losses, respectively,
which are derived from business done with or for patrons of the organization." Id.
§ 1388(jX4).
113. 26 C.F.R. § 1.1382-3(cX2) (1991) describes nonpatronage income. It states that
"'income derived from sources other than patronage' means incidental income derived
from sources not directly related to the marketing, purchasing, or service activities of the
cooperative association. For example, income derived from the lease of premises, from
investment in securities, or from the sale or exchange of capital assets, constitutes income
derived from sources other than patronage." Id.
114. See, e.g., St. Louis Bank for Coops. v. United States, 624 F.2d 1041, 1053 (Ct. Cl.
1980) (holding that the profit from the sale of an automobile used in the business of the
cooperative, together with other items of income, were patronage-based).
115. See Rev. Rul. 69-576, 1969-2 C.B. 166 (patronage allocations paid by bank for
cooperatives qualified as patronage dividends when distributed by recipient cooperative);
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Legislation is currently pending before Congress to clarify
whether income generated from the sale of a cooperative asset is
patronage or nonpatronage sourced. The current bill provides
that a cooperative may elect to treat gain or loss from the sale of an
asset as ordinary income or loss from business with or for patrons if
it was used by the organization "to facilitate the conduct of busi-
ness done with or for patrons."' 16 The statute would, therefore,
codify the test developed administratively and judicially. The
pending bills are currently under consideration by the appropriate
Congressional committees.1 7
The second cooperative tax issue recently clarified concerns
section 521 "exempt" cooperatives."" Such cooperatives are enti-
tled to deductions in addition to those provided nonexempt coop-
eratives under Subchapter T.1" In order to qualify for section 521
status, a cooperative must comply with a variety of restrictions set
out in the Internal Revenue Code. One of the designated require-
ments for a cooperative which has capital stock is that "substan-
tially all such stock" must be "owned by producers who market
their products or purchase their supplies and equipment through
the association. "120
Rev. Rul. 74-160, 1974-1 C.B. 246 (interest earned on loans to keep principal supplier in
business qualified as patronage dividends); Rev. Rul. 75-228, 1975-1 C.B. 278 (dividend
received by cooperative from its Domestic International Sales Corporation qualified as
patronage dividend); St. Louis Bank for Coops., 624 F.2d at 1053 (interest on surplus funds
earned by banking cooperative qualified as patronage dividends); Cotter & Co. v. United
States, 765 F.2d 1102 (1985) (interest earned on commercial paper and certificates of
deposit, and rental income, qualified as patronage dividends).
116. H.R. 2361, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). The bill provides that:
An organization may elect to treat gain or loss from the sale of other disposition
of any asset (including stock or any other ownership or financial interest in
another entity) as ordinary income or loss and to include such gain or loss in net
earnings of the organization from business done with or for patrons, if such asset
was used by the organization to facilitate the conduct of business done with or
for patrons.
Id. For the Senate Bill, see S. 1522, 102d Cong. 1st Sess. (1991).
117. H.R. 2361 was referred to the House Ways and Means Committee on May 15,
1991. S. 1522 was referred to the Senate Finance Committee on July 22, 1991.
118. See 26 U.S.C. § 521 (1988). The term "exempt," although widely used, is
technically a misnomer. To the extent that § 521 cooperatives fail to qualify for deductions
provided by Subchapter T, they are taxable like any other corporation. Id.
119. Id. § 1382. The additional deductions are set out in Subchapter T. Id. § 1382(c).
The additional deductions consist of dividends paid on capital stock, as well as amounts paid
to patrons on a patronage basis with respect to earnings derived from business done for the
United States or from sources other than patronage. Id.
120. Id. § 521(bX2). Section 521(bX2) provides in full that:
Exemption shall not be denied any such association because it has capital stock, if
the dividend rate of such stock is fixed at not to exceed the legal rate of interest
in the State of incorporation or 8 percent per annum, whichever is greater, on
the value of the consideration for which the stock was issued, and if substantially
all such stock (other than nonvoting preferred stock, the owners of which are not
entitled or permitted to participate, directly or indirectly, in the profits of the
association, upon dissolution or otherwise, beyond the fixed dividends) is owned
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In Revenue Procedure 73-39,121 the Internal Revenue Service
made clear that only producers marketing or purchasing more
than fifty percent of their products or supplies through the cooper-
ative would be counted for purposes of the "substantially all" test.
This position was rejected by the tax court in the 1987 case of
Farmers Cooperative Co. v. Commissioner.122 The court stated
that it was at a loss to understand the Service's concern about the
percentage of business activity. Since it could conceive of no evil
arising from patrons belonging to many cooperatives or only con-
ducting a small portion of their total business activity with a partic-
ular cooperative, the court concluded that the statute would be
satisfied by producers marketing any of their products or purchas-
ing any supplies and equipment through the association. 123
In Revenue Procedure 90-29, the IRS conceded.' 2 4 Recogniz-
ing that the relevant section 521 requirement is qualitative, not
quantitative, the Revenue Procedure provides that the stock
owned by "persons who transact any amount of current and active
patronage with an exempt cooperative during the cooperative's
taxable year." will be counted towards the "substantially all"
requirement. 2  The former revenue procedure was therefore
specifically revoked.
Further clarification and guidance in regard to cooperative
tax provisions in the past few years may be gleaned from Private
Letter Rulings, despite the fact that such rulings may not be relied
upon as precedent. 126 In regard to Subchapter T cooperatives, the
Rulings reiterate that whether the cooperative is "operating on a
cooperative basis" as required by subsection (aXI) of section 1381
of the Internal Revenue Code 127 continues to be governed by the
following factors: 1) democratic control, 2) subordination of capi-
tal, and 3) proportionate allocation of excess operating reve-
nues. 128 Additional factors to be considered include 1) joint effort
actively with, for, or on behalf of members, 2) minimum number
by producers who market their products or purchase their supplies and
equipment through the association.
Id.
121. Rev. Proc. 73-39, 1973-2 C.B. 502.
122. 89 T.C. 682 (1987).
123. Farmers Coop. Co. v. Comm'r, 89 T.C. 682, 687 (1987).
124. Rev. Proc. 90-29, 1990-1 C.B. 533.
125. Id.
126. 26 U.S.C. § 6110(jX3) (1988) (although revenue rulings are binding on the
taxpayers in issue, they are not accorded precedential weight, because they are subject to
only limited internal review).
127. 26 U.S.C. § 1381(aXl) (1988).
128. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-17-037 (Jan. 28, 1991). See also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-08-042 (Nov.
27, 1990).
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of patrons, 3) limited business with nonmembers, and 4) propor-
tionate participation in liquidation distributions. 129 Recent rulings
also indicate some flexibility within Subchapter T for business
arrangements with other entities1 30  or for de minimus
variations. 131
As for section 521 cooperatives, recent rulings indicate that
the requirements continue to be strictly applied. Such coopera-
tives can retain section 521 status during liquidation only if liqui-
dating distributions are made in the same manner as earnings.' 32
Further, section 521 cooperatives must treat members and non-
members alike in regard to distributions 33 and may market for
nonproducers only in emergency situations.' 34 Recent Technical
Advice Memorandums further indicate that cooperatives need not
file informational returns for hauling services rendered by truck-
ers135 and that assessments against cooperative members to cover
losses may be deducted on the member's tax return as ordinary
business expenses.' 3 6
Although no major changes have been made recently in the
area of cooperative taxation, both legislative and administrative
action continue to clarify cooperative tax issues. The result is
greater certainty for cooperative operations.
V. SECURITIES
Cooperative authorities have expressed varying degrees of
concern through the years as to whether financial instruments
issued by cooperatives 'constitute securities within the meaning of
129. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-17-037 (Jan. 28, 1991).
130. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-33-006 (May 14, 1990) (holding that portions of income resulting
from sales to cooperative patrons but earned by partnership formed between cooperative
and corporation was eligible for patronage dividend deduction).
131. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-49-026 (September 10, 1990) (permitting cooperative to reduce
recordkeeping costs by retaining very small patronage dividends and by paying small
patronage dividends in cash or by application to stock subscriptions).
132. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-21-013 (Feb. 21, 1990). Such distributions must be paid on a
patronage basis in proportion "in sofar as is practicable" to business done. Id. For a
discussion of that requirement in regard to a cooperative attempting to liquidate on the
basis of inadequate records, see Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-38-014 (June 18, 1991).
133. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-14-002 (Nov. 27, 1990) (Section 521 cooperative lost its exempt
status by dealing with nonmembers on a commercial basis in purchasing their products at
current market price and returning to them no patronage dividends).
134. For two rulings in which section 521 cooperatives were permitted to market for
nonproducers under the emergency exception, see Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-34-043 (May 29, 1990)
(nature of production was inelastic, sales commitments were made months in advance,
production fell below projections due to heavy rainfall, pest infestation and unexpected
production bottlenecks); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-32-038 (May 13, 1991) (record bad weather
conditions, decline in production, pre-existing contractual commitments).
135. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-27-002 (Mar. 13, 1991).
136. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-28-007 (Mar. 28, 1991).
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federal and state securities law.' 37 If such instruments are so char-
acterized, they become potentially subject to comprehensive and
technical registration and disclosure requirements at both the fed-
eral and state levels. The question may arise as to a variety of
cooperative financial instruments, including membership stock,
instruments reflecting retained equity, and debt instruments as
discussed in this section.
In regard to the issuance of membership stock, cooperatives
have taken solace from the 1975 case of United Housing Founda-
tion, Inc. v. Forman.138 In Forman, the Supreme Court held that
membership stock in a housing cooperative was not a security
within the meaning of the Securities Act of 1933, because it lacked
certain characteristics-characteristics typically lacking in several
of the financial instruments issued by agricultural cooperatives.' 39
These characteristics included that the stock was not transferrable,
could not be pledged or bequeathed, carried only one vote despite
the number of shares held, and was issued for a particular purpose
other than investment. Because the stock was not a security
within the meaning of the federal act, the Supreme Court held
that it could not serve as the basis for fraud claims under the fed-
eral securities laws. 140
In regard to retained equity, cooperatives have been com-
forted by certain no-action letters issued by the Securities and
Exchange Commission. However, the Commission makes clear
that in issuing such letters it reaches no legal conclusion that secur-
ities are not being issued.' 41 Even if a cooperative instrument is
classified as a security, however, an agricultural cooperative might
137. See, e.g., Steve F. Brault, Equity Financing of Cooperatives: Advantageous
Federal Securities Laws and Tax Treatment, 21 WILLAMEI-rE L. REV. 225 (1985) (examines
equity capital formation of cooperative in light of federal securities law and tax provisions);
Jerome P. Weiss & Edward B. Crosland, Fact v. Fiction in Regulation of Agricultural
Cooperative Securities, 31 Coop. ACC'T. 12 (1978) (reviews issues and regulatory activities in
the area of securities regulation of agricultural cooperatives); Terence J. Centner, Retained
Equities of Agricultural Cooperatives and the Federal Securities Acts, 31 KAN. L. REV. 245
(1983) (analyzes patronage dividends and per-unit retain allocations to determine likelihood
of judicial classification as securities); Jerome P. Weiss, Reasons for and Costs of Registration
of Agricultural Cooperative Securities, AGRIC. L. J. 201 (1982) (discusses methods to be
considered and used by agricultural cooperatives to satisfy applicable federal securities law
requirements).
138. 421 U.S. 837 (1975). See Brault, supra note 137, at 242-49 (regarding the issuance
of no-action letters by the SEC in regard to membership interests).
139. Forman, 421 U.S. at 858-60. For a discussion of the instruments issued by
agricultural cooperatives, see MATTHEWS, supra note 11.
140. Forman, 421 U.S. at 859-60.
141. Mid-American Dairymen, Inc., [1977-78 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
81,110 (Feb. 2, 1977); United Suppliers, Inc., [1977-78 Transfer binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 81,147 (Mar. 14, 1977). See Weiss, supra note 137, at 202-03. In regard to more
recent no-action letters, see Brault, supra note 137, at 244 n.93.
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be able to claim an exemption. Exemptions from registration are
created by a variety of specific provisions of federal and state
securities statutes.
142
In regard to debt instruments, the Supreme Court has
recently made clear, in Reves v. Ernst & Young, 143 that promissory
notes issued by agricultural cooperatives with certain characteris-
tics will constitute securities within the meaning of the federal
securities law.144 The case was remanded to the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals, which has recently held that the debt instru-
ments under consideration also constituted securities within the
meaning of the Arkansas blue sky law.
145
The Reves case is instructive as to the circumstances and the
instrument characteristics which should cause an agricultural
cooperative to consider securities registration under federal or
state law.' 46 In that case, the relevant cooperative raised money
to support its general business operations by the issuance of uncol-
lateralized and uninsured promissory notes payable on demand by
the holder.' 47 The notes were sold to both members and non-
members of the cooperative, were marketed as an "Investment
Program," and were paid a variable rate of interest exceeding that
of local financial institutions.' 48  When the cooperative filed for
bankruptcy, holders of the notes sued a variety of defendants,
including the cooperative's directors, manager, attorneys, and
accountants.' 49 Among other claims, the note holders asserted
that the defendant accounting firm had intentionally failed to fol-
low generally accepted accounting principles in valuing one of the
142. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c(aX2)-(l1), 77d(1)-(6) (1988). In addition to these
exemptions, the Securities Act of 1933 sets out a specific exemption for any security issued
by "a farmer's cooperative organization exempt from tax under section 521 of Title 26.'" Id.
§ 77c(aX5XB). The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 also recognizes an exemption for
cooperative associations as defined in the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1929. Such
securities are exempt from registration, periodic reporting, proxy regulation, and insider
trading provisions. 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(gX2XE), 78m, 78n, 78p (1988). The Agricultural
Marketing Act is set out at 12 U.S.C. § 1141j (1988).
In regard to blue sky laws, forty-two states grant complete or partial exemption to
agricultural cooperatives. See JAMES R. BAARDA, USDA, AGRIC. COOPERATIVE SERVICE,
STATE SECURITY LAW EXEMPTIONS FOB FARMER COOPERATIVES (1984).
143. 494 U.S. 56 (1990). See generally HARRY BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES LAW
HANDBOOK § 4.04 (1990-91); Lucy Wiggins, Cooperatives, Securities Violations, and
Advisor Liabilities: A Case Study, 2 J. OF AGRIC. Coop. 97 (1987).
144. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 67 (1990).
145. Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 937 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1991). On remand, the
Eighth Circuit further found that Arkansas law provides for secondary liability for aiding
and abetting securities violations, and that the district court had therefore properly denied
the accounting firm's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Id. at 1324.
146. Reves, 494 U.S. at 56.
147. Id. at 58.
148. Id. at 58-59.
149. Id. at 59.
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cooperative's major assets for purposes of an audit. The holders
brought an antifraud action, alleging that if the accountants had
properly valued the asset, they would not have purchased the
demand notes because the cooperative's insolvency would have
been apparent.15
0
Judgment was entered by the district court on a substantial
jury award to the note holders based on violations of the antifraud
provisions of both federal and state securities law.15' On appeal
by the cooperative's accounting firm, the defendant claimed that
the demand notes in issue did not comprise securities within the
meaning of either federal or state securities law. The Eighth Cir-
cuit, applying the test for securities developed by the Supreme
Court in SEC v. W.J. Howey, Co., 52 agreed and therefore reversed
the judgment of the district court.15 ' On appeal, the Supreme
Court, in a split decision, rejected the Howey test as the appropri-
ate measure for determining whether a promissory note consti-
tuted a security within the meaning of the federal statute and
reversed the judgment of the Eighth Circuit. 15 4
In place of the Howey test, the Supreme Court adopted the
"family resemblance" test developed by the Second Circuit as the
appropriate standard.'5 5  The "family resemblance" approach
begins with a presumption that any note with a term of more than
nine months is a "security."' 51 6 In recognition of the fact that not
all notes are securities, however, the approach then identifies a list
of notes that are obviously not securities. 157  The "family resem-
blance" test permits an issuer to rebut the presumption that a note
is a security if it can show that the note in question bears a strong
family resemblance to an item on the list, or convinces the court to
add a new instrument to the list.'15
The Supreme Court identified four factors that were consid-
150. Id. The asset was a gasohol plant. Id.
151. Id.
152. 328 U.S. 293 (1946). The Howey test defines a security as (1) an investment; (2) in
a common enterprise; (3) with a reasonable expectation of profits; (4) to be derived from the
entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others. Id. at 301.
153. Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 856 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir. 1988).
154. Reves, 494 U.S. at 64.
155. Id. at 65.
156. Id. at 63.
157. Id. The list devised by the Second Circuit and cited with approval by the
Supreme Court includes the following types of notes: "[a] note delivered in consumer
financing, [a] note secured by a mortgage on a home, a short-term note secured by a lien on
a small business or some of its assets, [a] note evidencing a 'character' loan to a bank
customer, short-term notes secured by an assignment of accounts receivable, or a note
which simply formalizes an open-account debt incurred in the ordinary course of business."
Id. at 65.
158. Id.
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ered in labeling listed items as nonsecurities. The first factor was
the motivation for the sale.' 59 "If the seller's purpose is to raise
money for the general use of a business enterprise or to finance
substantial investments and the buyer is interested primarily in
the profit the note is expected to generate, the [note] is likely to be
a 'security.' "160 If, on the other hand, the note is utilized to facili-
tate the purchase of a minor asset or consumer good, to correct the
seller's cash-flow difficulties, or to fulfill some other commercial or
consumer purpose, the note is less likely to be a security.'
The second consideration was the plan of distribution.'6 2 The
Court stated that it would examine the instrument to determine
whether it was one in which there was "common trading for spec-
ulation or investment.' 63 The third factor was the reasonable
expectation of the investing public.' 64 The Court indicated that a
note may be held to be a security because of public expectations,
even though an economic analysis of the transaction might suggest
otherwise. 165 The final factor identified by the Court was whether
another regulatory scheme existed which "significantly reduce[d]
the risk of the instrument, thereby rendering [the] application of
the Securities Acts unnecessary. 166
Applying the family resemblance approach to the facts in
Reves, the Court had little difficulty in concluding that the notes in
issue were securities. 167 Regarding the motivation factor, the
Court stated that the cooperative had "sold the notes in an effort
to raise capital for its general business operations, and purchasers
[had] bought them in order to earn a profit in the form of inter-
est."'611 Regarding the distribution factor, the Court acknowl-
edged that the Coop had offered the notes over an extended
period to its 23,000 members, as well as to nonmembers, and that
more than 1600 people held notes at the time the cooperative filed
159. Reves, 494 U.S. at 66.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. (quoting SEC v. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 355 (1943)).
164. Reves, 494 U.S. at 66.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 67.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 67-68. The Supreme Court rejected the position of the Eighth Circuit that
the interest on the notes in issue could not be construed as "profit." Id. at 67-68 n.4. In a
footnote, the Court emphasized that "by 'profit' in the context of notes, we mean 'a
valuable return on an investment,' which undoubtedly includes interest." Id. The Court
recognized that 'profit' had been defined more restrictively in applying the Howey test to
investment contracts, but refused to apply that restrictive definition to the determination of
whether an instrument was a "note" within the definition of the federal securities acts. Id.
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for bankruptcy. 169  Although the notes were not traded on an
exchange, the Court found that the offer and sale to that broad
segment of the public sufficiently established the requisite "com-
mon trading."17
As for the public expectation factor, the Court noted that
advertisements for the notes characterized them as "investments,"
and that there were no countervailing factors leading reasonable
persons to question that characterization. 171 Finally, in consider-
ing alternative protection, the Court found no risk-reducing factor
to suggest that the instruments were not securities. 72 Pointing
out that the notes were uncollateralized and uninsured, the Court
expressed its concern that the notes in issue would escape federal
regulation entirely if the securities acts did not apply.' 73
In light of Reves, it would behoove agricultural cooperatives to
undertake a thoughtful review of all financial instruments they
issue. Although membership stock and equity certificates may still
fall outside the securities classification as discussed above, debt
instruments issued for revenue-raising purposes should be care-
fully evaluated under the Reves guidelines.
VI. BANKRUPTCY
Cooperative issues have also recently been addressed in the
169. Reves, 494 U.S. at 68.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 69.
172. Id.
173. Id. A final issue addressed by the Court caused four Justices to dissent. The issue
was whether the notes in Reves fell within an exemption in the 1934 Act for "any note...
which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months . I..." ld  at 70
(citing 15 U.S.C. § 78c(aX10) (1988)). Although the notes in issue were demand notes and
thus immediately mature for state purposes, four Justices concluded that the maturity of the
notes was a question of federal law. Id. at 71-72. Since demand could be made for
payment either before or after the nine-months limit, the plurality opinion stated that it
was plausible that the maturity of a demand note could be regarded as being in excess of
nine months. Id. at 72-73. The plurality stated, "'Given this ambiguity, the exclusion must
be interpreted in accordance with its purpose." Id. at 73. In light of Congress' broader
purpose of ensuring that investments be regulated to prevent fraud and abuse, the four
Justices interpreted the exception not to cover the demand notes in issue. Id.
Justice Stevens, in a concurring opinion, agreed that the notes in issue were securities
but disagreed as to why they fell outside the nine-months exemption. Id. at 73-76 (Stevens,
J., concurring). Justice Stevens concluded that the exemption should not be read literally,
but should apply only to the types of commercial paper indicated by the legislative history
of the 1933 Act-that is, to short-term, high quality instruments issued to fund current
operations and sold only to highly sophisticated investors. Id. at 75-76.
Justices Rehnquist, White, O'Connor and Scalia dissented. Although agreeing that the
notes in issue were "securities," the dissenters concluded that the instruments issued by the
Co-op were exempted by the nine-months exclusion. Id. at 76-82 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Asserting that the notes were immediately due because payable on demand, the dissenters
concluded that the notes therefore fell within the nine-months exemption. Id. at 82.
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bankruptcy field.'74 The United States Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Minnesota considered jurisdictional issues in In re Fulda
Independent Cooperative.'75 In that case, a Minnesota agricultural
cooperative had filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition,
designating the St. Paul Bank for Cooperatives as its principal
secured creditor. The Bank agreed to settle its claims against the
bankruptcy estate in return for certain property and the proceeds
of the sale of other property. Subsequent to the sale, certain coop-
erative patrons brought suit against the Bank in state court. The
patrons alleged that the Bank had converted agricultural supplies,
that vehicles had been fraudulently transferred to the Bank, and
that the Bank had committed fraud or negligent misrepresenta-
tion in holding out that it had the right to seize supplies and take
certain other action. The Bank removed the case to bankruptcy
court, and the patrons thereafter sought to remove it from bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction.
The bankruptcy court found that an action based on the fraud-
ulent transfer of vehicles was a "core proceeding" over which it
had jurisdiction. 176 The court noted that only the bankruptcy
trustee has standing to prosecute an action for avoidance of the
fraudulent conveyance of the debtor's property.'7 7  The court
therefore dismissed with prejudice the patrons' cause of action
based on the transfer of vehicles, but specified that such dismissal
was without prejudice to the bankruptcy trustee.17 8  The court
also found that the remaining claims were "related proceedings"
over which it had jurisdiction. 7 9 Because the claims were based
on common law injuries to property and were likely to be deter-
mined prior to the termination of the bankruptcy proceeding, the
court exercised its discretion to abstain from hearing and deciding
them.18 0 It therefore remanded those issues to the state court.1
8
'
The case illustrates the difficulty patrons may have in charac-
terizing injuries as individual claims separate from the cooperative
bankruptcy proceeding. Although the fraudulent transfer counts
of the patrons' complaint were "cleverly worded" as a claim for
174. For bankruptcy issues in regard to cooperatives generally, see John D. Copeland,
The Status of an Agricultural Cooperative When a Farmer Member Experiences Financial
Distress, 23 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 551 (1990).
175. 130 B.R. 967 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991).
176. In re Fulda Independent Coop., 130 B.R. 967, 973-74 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991).
177. Id. at 978.
178. Id. at 979.
179. Id. at 975.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 978.
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money damages rather than the physical return of the property,
the court in In re Fulda looked to the gist of the complaint. 18 2 The
court held that the substance of the action was the satisfaction of
patron claims against the cooperative by the recovery of value lost
by the debtor in a fraudulent transfer, which issue should be deter-
mined by the bankruptcy court. 183
Cooperative bankruptcy may also trigger the resolution of
certain side issues. In Quattrone Accountants, Inc. v. IRS, i8 4 the
cooperative's accounting firm was held liable for federal employee
withholding taxes not paid by a bankrupt cooperative. 185  The
court noted that the accounting firm had been authorized to pay
bills, distribute payroll, and prepare and file tax returns for the
cooperative without prior board approval.1 86 The court found that
the firm knew taxes were not being paid and that the firm had
such influence with the board that it could have caused the taxes
to be paid rather than debts to other creditors.1 81 Under such cir-
cumstances, the court concluded that the accounting firm was a
responsible person wilfully failing to account for and pay federal
employment taxes within the meaning of Section 6672 of the
Internal Revenue Code.' Accountants granted comparable pow-
ers by agricultural cooperatives would, therefore, be well advised
to use their influence to assure that taxes are paid as due.
Bankruptcy issues also arise when the bankrupt party is a
cooperative patron rather than the cooperative itself. In the
recent case of In re Bennett,18 9 a husband and wife filed a volun-
tary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition and were discharged in
1985.19 Over three years later, the Bennetts filed an amendment
to their schedules to add property not originally listed. The addi-
tional property included bonds and "shares of equity patronage"
in a cotton cooperative. Furthermore, the Bennetts amended
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. 895 F.2d 921 (3d Cir. 1990).
185. Quattrone Accts., Inc. v. IRS, 895 F.2d 921, 928 (3d Cir. 1990).
186. Id. at 927.
187. Id. at 928.
188. Quattrone, 895 F.2d at 927. Section 6672 provides that:
Any person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over any tax
imposed by this title who willfully fails to collect such tax, or truthfully account
for and pay over such tax, or willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat
any such tax or the payment thereof, shall, in addition to other penalties
provided by law, be liable to a penalty equal to the total amount of the tax
evaded, or not collected, or not accounted for and paid over.
26 U.S.C. § 6672(a) (1988).
189. 126 B.R. 869 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991).
190. In re Bennett, 126 B.R. 869, 871 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991).
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their exemptions to claim the bonds (valued at $1) and shares (val-
ued at $8297) as exempt property. Debtors refused to divulge the
total amount of money they had received from these sources. The
Trustee's exhibits revealed, however, that the Debtors had
received substantial payments on the bonds and over $92,500 in
redemption of equity patronage since the filing of their petition.
Based on the failure of the debtors to report and deliver that prop-
erty, the Trustee requested the revocation of their discharge.
Since all the payments in issue arose out of Debtors' prepeti-
tion farming operations, the court concluded that all such pay-
ments constituted property of the estate. 19' Holding that the
Bennetts had knowingly and fraudulently failed to surrender all
property and records concerning property of the estate to the
Trustee, the court revoked the discharge in bankruptcy and
entered judgment against the Bennetts for the property received
by them post petition, less amounts the court allowed as
exempt.' 92
As the above cases indicate, parties involved in transactions
with agricultural cooperatives are subject to the same bankruptcy
risks and obligations as those dealing with other types of entities.
Such parties must, therefore, exercise care to avoid liability for
unpaid obligations of the bankrupt entity, such as that imposed
upon the accountants in In re Fulda. They should also list honestly
and completely any assets held by them in an agricultural coopera-
tive to protect their bankruptcy discharge from the type of revoca-
tion granted in In re Bennett.
VII. MERGER
One problem which frequently arises when cooperatives
merge is the extent of protection afforded to dissenting mem-
bers. 193 Traditional corporate law permits shareholders dissenting
from a merger to exercise appraisal rights to receive the value of
their shares. 19 4 Whether such rights are afforded to cooperative
members depends upon state law. Many state cooperative statutes
contain specific references to merger, 9 ' although only a few detail
191. Id. at 873.
192. Id. at 876.
193. See generally Kathryn J. Sedo, Cooperative Mergers and Consolidations: A
Consideration of the Legal and Tax Issues, 63 N.D. L. REV. 377 (1987).
194. See, e.g., REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT §§ 13.01-13.31 (1984)
(which was promulgated by the Committee on Corporate Laws (Section of Corporation,
Banking & Business Law) of the American Bar Association. This statute has served as the
model for many state corporate codes).
195. See BAARDA, supra note 2, § 16.01 and Table 16.01.
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the rights of members who dissent. 196 In the absence of a coopera-
tive provision, the general corporate law will usually be relied
upon. 197 Since corporate law only applies if its provisions are not
inconsistent with the cooperative statute, however, the applicabil-
ity of corporate appraisal rights to cooperatives may still be subject
to dispute. 19
8
The issue of dissenters' rights at cooperative merger recently
arose in the case of Van Der Maaten v. Farmers Cooperative Co. 199
In that case, a member of both of two merging cooperatives dis-
sented from the merger and sought a lump sum payment of his
interest.20 0 The relevant Iowa cooperative statute provided as
follows:
The new association shall pay to each dissenting member
in cash within sixty days after the merger or consolidation
the amount paid in cash by the dissenting member for
that member's interest in the old association. The new
association shall pay the remainder of each dissenting
member's fair value at the same time other payments of
deferred patronage dividends or redemption of preferred
stock are made, but in any event within fifteen years after
the merger or consolidation.20 '
Pursuant to the statute, Van Der Maaten received the $20 he had
paid for his interest in the old associations.2 °2 The parties further
agreed that the "fair value" of his interest in the merged coopera-
tives was $11,193.29.203 The only issue in dispute, therefore, was
when that amount was required to be paid by the cooperative.
Van Der Maaten asserted that the amount must be paid in full at
the time the cooperative made patronage dividend payments or
redeemed preferred stock. The cooperative, on the other hand,
asserted that Van Der Maaten was entitled to receive only a pro
rata share of the total when such payments were made.
In terms of policy, the cooperative argued that the statute was
designed to relieve financially troubled cooperatives of the obliga-
tion to pay a dissenting member in full. The member responded
that financially troubled cooperatives were adequately protected
196. See id. § 16.09 and Table 16.09.
197. See supra note 15.
198. See Sedo, supra note 193, at 398-99.
199. 472 N.W.2d 283 (Iowa 1991).
200. Van Der Maaten v. Farmers Coop. Co., 472 N.W.2d 283, 283-84 (Iowa 1991).
201. IOWA CODE § 499.66(3) (1991).
202. Van Der Maaten, 472 N.W.2d at 284.
203. Id.
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because they need not pay at all for fifteen years, unless financially
able to pay dividends to all members.
The Iowa Supreme Court found Van Der Maaten's interpreta-
20tion persuasive. 04 Because the statute was susceptible to two con-
structions, the court referred to prior legislation.2 °5 The prior
statute had specifically required that payments to dissenting mem-
bers at merger be paid at the same time and in the same propor-
tion as those to nondissenting members.2 °6 Furthermore, a
companion statute prohibited dissenting members from thereafter
doing business with the cooperative. Because the statute had been
amended to delete the proportionality requirement and because it
appeared to sever the relationship between former members and
the new association, the court interpreted it to require a lump sum
payment to the dissenting member at the time the cooperative
paid patronage dividends or redeemed preferred stock. 0 7 The
court stated that it did not attribute to the legislature an intention
to deny the former member the privilege of doing business with
the cooperative, yet require him to continue to support it finan-
cially. 2 8 The rights of dissenters at the merger of agricultural
cooperatives remains a controversial area. As the Van Der Maaten
case illustrates, even cooperative statutes specifically addressing
the issue of merger may require judicial clarification.
VIII. MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES
A variety of issues have been addressed in recent cooperative
cases which are not unique to cooperatives. Cooperatives are
often parties to product liability suits, either as plaintiff" 9 or
defendant.2 0 Cooperatives may be held liable for sexual discrimi-
11o 212 tenation2 1 or for retaliatory discharge, and the entity and its
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 285.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See, e.g., Ag-Chem Equip. v. Limestone Farmers Coop., 567 So. 2d 250 (Ala. 1990)
(cooperative as plaintiff in suit for breach of warranty as to fertilizer applicator); Midwhey
Powder Co. v. Clayton Indus., 460 N.W.2d 426 (Wis. App. 1990) (corporation and two
cheese cooperatives bring suit against manufacturer and seller of steam generators used to
generate electric power).
210. See, e.g., Evangeline Farmers Coop. v. Fontenot, 565 So. 2d 1040 (La. Ct. App.
1990) (cooperative liable for damages for negligently supplying wrong chemical); Baggett
v. Bradley County Farmers Coop., 789 S.W.2d 733 (Ark. 1990) (suit against cooperative for
negligently mixing cattle feed into hog feed survives summary judgment motion); Shuman
v. Laverne Farmers Coop., 809 P.2d 76 (Okla. Ct. App. 1991) (cooperative liable for
compensatory and punitive damages for failure to pass on manufacturer's warning
regarding use of tire).
211. See Sandoval v. Saticoy Lemon Ass'n, 747 F. Supp. 1373 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (entity
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officers may be barred from government contracts as a result of
violations of ASCS requirements.2 13 It may also be necessary to
determine the issue of cooperative citizenship for purposes of fed-
eral diversity jurisdiction.214 Although these cases raise interest-
ing issues, they contribute little to the understanding of the
agricultural cooperative as a unique entity.
IX. CONCLUSION
This review of current developments in the cooperative field
reveals that even in a short time span a variety of cooperative
issues have been addressed. Interesting questions have been con-
fronted in the courts concerning fiduciary duties owed by coopera-
tives, the classification of cooperative instruments as securities,
and the rights of dissenters at cooperative merger. Federal admin-
istrative agencies continue to attack cooperative acquisitions of
noncooperatives, to evaluate the Capper-Volstead exemption, and
to enforce the federal tax code in light of cooperative functions. In
addition, Congress has taken steps to clarify certain cooperative
tax provisions. As in any field of legal study, the law applicable to
agricultural cooperatives reveals a continuing evolution based on
the interplay of the various branches of government.
resulting from merger of two agricultural cooperatives held liable under Title VII for sexual
discrimination in hiring practices).
212. See Spiker v. Farmers Coop. Exchange, 802 P.2d 650 (Okla. 1990) (retaliatory
discharge suit against cooperative held to survive death of plaintiff.)
213. See Girard v. Klopfenstein, 930 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1991). In that case, the CCC
discovered that some of the barrel cheese sold by a cooperative to the ASCS was ineligible.
After a preliminary investigation, the cooperative was suspended from selling cheese to the
government for 18 months. Id. at 739. Furthermore, the President and Sales Manager
were notified of a hearing to debar them from participation in government contracts for
one year. Id. at 739. The President and Sales Manager, therefore, brought a declaratory
judgment suit to determine if they were entitled to have the hearing a) conducted by an
administrative law judge, and b) conducted pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act.
Id. at 740. The Ninth Circuit concluded that neither were required. Id. at 743.
214. See Luke v. Western Dairy Coop., Inc. 734 F. Supp. 963, 967 (D. Utah 1990) (for
purposes of federal diversity jurisdiction, dairyman's cooperative is citizen of both state of
incorporation and state of principal place of business).
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